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I. INTRODUCTIONTHE review period for this issue is distinguished by a decision in
one of the most anticipated health care cases in recent history: Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.1 This case
was a challenge to the 2010 Affordable Care Act,2 which was frequently
referred to, generally derisively, during the 2012 presidential campaign as
"Obamacare." The decision in this historical case sets the tone for most of
the other cases decided during this Survey period. These cases illustrate
the rapidly changing nature of the health care business environment.
Some of the cases demonstrate ways in which health care providers are
attempting to adapt their business practices, while others relate to high
profile issues such as abortion and the relationship between health care
providers and health plans.
* B.S., Texas Tech University; M.B.A., University of Dallas; J.D., University of
Houston. Partner at Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker.
1. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012).
2. See generally, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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II. SCOPE OF TEXAS MEDICAL LIABILITY ACT
The Winter 2011 Health Care Law Survey Article included a discussion
of the Texas Supreme Court decision in Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Hospital, which expanded the scope of claims that may be brought under
the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (the Medical
Liability Act), codified in Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.3 Cases during this current Survey period continue to il-
lustrate the broad scope of the Medical Liability Act and the substantial
limitations it places on plaintiffs seeking relief in health care related
matters.
A. APPLICATION To EMPLOYEE INJURY CLAIMS
The first case is an interesting decision by the Texas Supreme Court
involving an employee injured on the job during an altercation with a
psychiatric patient.4 The supreme court concluded that a "claimant" does
not have to be an individual whose medical treatment is at issue for the
matter to fall within the scope of the Medical Liability Act.5 To arrive at
this conclusion, the supreme court's analysis sometimes stretched the lim-
its of statutory interpretation.
In Texas West Oaks Hospital v. Williams, employee Frederick Williams
(Williams) was injured while on duty at the hospital when a psychiatric
patient that he was supervising attacked him.6 The patient died as a result
of injuries sustained in the altercation, and his estate brought a health
care liability claim (HCLC) against the hospital and Williams.7 Williams
entered a cross claim against the hospital for negligence.8 The trial court
denied the hospital's motion to dismiss the employee's negligence claim
as a HCLC, and the hospital filed an interlocutory appeal.9
Williams's negligence claims against the hospital included the follow-
ing: failure to properly train Williams, failure to adequately supervise em-
ployees, failure to provide adequate protocols to avoid or decrease the
severity of altercations like the one experienced by Williams, failure to
provide employees with adequate emergency notification procedures or
devices, failure to warn Williams of the dangers that the hospital knew or
should have known were associated with working with patients, and fail-
ure to provide a safe workplace for its employees.10 The hospital's motion
to dismiss asserted that Williams's claims were HCLCs under the Texas
Medical Act and should be dismissed for Williams's failure to provide an
expert report as required." The trial court denied the hospital's motion,
3. Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex. 2010).
4. Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2012).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 174-75.
7. Id. at 175.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 176.




as did the appeals court. 12 The appeals court addressed the similarities
between the patient's and Williams's claims and concluded, at least in
part in the withdrawn opinion in Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospi-
tal,13 that Williams's claims were separable from health care and were not
HCLCs.14 Specifically, it concluded that Williams's safety claims "'flow
from the employment relationship' between Williams and West Oaks and
are not 'directly related' to health care, as required by the statute."15
The supreme court's decision analyzed the Medical Liability Act's defi-
nition of the term "claimant," which means "a person, including a dece-
dent's estate, seeking or who has sought recovery of damages in a health
care liability claim."' 6 The supreme court concluded that the use of the
term "claimant" instead of "patient" expands the breadth of HCLCs be-
yond the patient population, which in turn necessarily "widen[s] the reach
of the expert report requirement."1 7
The supreme court also addressed whether Williams's "safety claims"
could be characterized as HCLCs, stating that "[w]e have not decided
whether safety claims must be 'directly related to healthcare,"' 18 which
seems to keep the door open to the possibility that some safety claims
might appropriately be brought under negligence causes of action. How-
ever, the supreme court's conclusion in this case, while not closing that
door entirely, suggests that most safety related claims brought by claim-
ants in health care facilities will be characterized as HCLCs.
The term "safety" is not defined in the Medical Liability Act. The su-
preme court has thus far declined to define "the precise boundaries of the
safety prong." 19 The definition of a HCLC was modified by the legisla-
ture in 2003, and these modifications added the following italicized words
to the definition: "a cause of action for a 'claimed departure from ac-
cepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional
or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately
results in injury or death of a claimant." 20
This opinion includes a lengthy analysis of how the addition of the itali-
cized phrase may relate to the safety prong of an HCLC, concluding that
the phrase "directly related to health care" modifies only professional or
administrative services and does not modify the terms medical care,
health care, or safety. 2 1 This appears to expand HCLCs as to safety re-
lated claims. Therefore, injuries suffered by a claimant in an altercation
12. Id. at 176.
13. See Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1184 (2009), with-
drawn and superseded on rehearing, 319 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. 2010).
14. Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 176.
15. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West 2011)).
16. Id. at 178 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(2)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 184 (citing Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex.
2005); Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 662-63 (Tex. 2010)).
20. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13)).
21. Id. at 184-85.
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with a patient, such as that experienced by Williams, do not have to be
related to the health care provision to implicate the safety prong of
HCLCs. 22
Williams also unsuccessfully argued that his claims against his employer
should be classified as workers' compensation claims and not HCLCs. 23
The supreme court found no conflict between the Texas Workers' Com-
pensation Act (TWCA) and the Medical Liability Act. 24 Under the
TWCA, individuals working for employers that subscribe to the TWCA
are generally prohibited from filing suit against their employer for inju-
ries incurred while on the job.25 However, in some cases, employees can
elect to waive their right to workers' compensation coverage and instead
can choose to recover damages from their employer under various com-
mon law remedies. 26 Likewise, employees of non-subscribing employers
have the right to pursue common law rights of action for on-the-job inju-
ries.27 These two types of employees are also treated differently under
the Medical Liability Act for remedies for on-the-job injuries. 28 Employ-
ees of health care employers that are subscribers to the workers' compen-
sation program must bring their cases under the TWCA. 29 However,
employees who work for non-subscriber employers must bring their in-
jury claims as HCLCs.30 Williams's employer was a workers' compensa-
tion non-subscriber, thus eliminating the basis for arguing that his claims
must be classified as workers' compensation claims.31
In conclusion, Williams's claims that West Oaks Hospital failed to
properly train, warn, and supervise his work with potentially dangerous
psychiatric patients were properly characterized as HCLCs, and Wil-
liams's failure to provide an expert report as required by the Medical
Liability Act was fatal to his case against the hospital.32 The supreme
court reversed the appeals court and remanded the case with instructions
to dismiss Williams's claims.33
Justice Lehrmann wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Medina and Wil-
lett, arguing that
[t]he Court's strained reading of the statute runs counter to express
statutory language, the Legislature's stated purposes in enacting the
current version of chapter 74, and common sense. Further, the
Court's decision undermines the balance struck by the Legislature to
encourage employers to become subscribers under the Workers










32. Id. at 192-93.
33. Id. at 193.
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Compensation Act.34
The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's position that a "claim-
ant" under the Medical Liability Act can be an individual with no physi-
cian-patient relationship as long as a physician-patient relationship is
"involved" in the matter.35 A compelling discussion is provided to show
that a HCLC "must be founded on a health care provider's alleged
breach of a professional duty towards a patient." 36 Section 74.051 of the
Medical Liability Act requires, as part of a claimant's notice, a form au-
thorizing release of the medical records of "the patient" whose treatment
is the subject of the claim.37 The dissent points out the inconsistency of
this requirement as it applies to the injured employee's claims.38 The dis-
sent further points out that the majority's decision was inconsistent with
the Medical Liability Act's definition of an expert report, which is de-
fined in relevant part as "a written report by an expert that provides a fair
summary of the expert's opinions . . . regarding ... the manner in which
the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the
standards."39 With respect to the majority's analysis of safety, Justice
Lehrmann stated that he would hold that a claim for safety must arise
from the breach of a health care provider's duty to "adequately ensure a
patient's safety in providing health care services." 40
Although the supreme court's decision in this case will be applauded by
many health care employers, the author tends to agree with the dissent
that characterizing an employee's claims of inadequate training and an
unsafe workplace as HCLCs is inconsistent with the intent of the Medical
Liability Act.
B. Dury TO INFORM: EXTREMELY RARE COMPLICATIONS
Sanchez v. Martin is another interesting HCLC case, but this case arises
from the use of donor organs from a person who, unknown to the health
care providers, was infected with the rabies virus. 41 Several individuals
that received these infected organs died from the rabies infection, which
is virtually fatal unless treated immediately following exposure. 42 Dr.
Sanchez, the surgeon who performed the organ transplant surgery, al-
leged claims against the hospital and the two transplant surgeons, includ-
ing: failure to obtain informed consent, general negligence, gross
34. Id. (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 194-95 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 194 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting) (citing Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Ru-
bio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 85t, 854 (Tex. 2005)).
37. Id. at 195 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. CODE ANN.
§ 74.051(d) (West 2011)).
38. Id. at 194-95 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 195-96 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing TEX. CIV.
PRAC. CODE ANN. § 74.351(r)(6)).
40. Id. at 198 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).
41. Sanchez v. Martin, 378 S.W.3d 581, 586 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).
42. Id.
2013]1 Health Care Law 933
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negligence, and fraud or intentional misrepresentation. 43 The adequacy of
the plaintiff's expert report was a primary issue analyzed by the Dallas
Court of Appeals in arriving at its decision.44 The noteworthy claims in
this case included the plaintiff's allegations that (1) the defendants failed
to obtain informed consent, and (2) the hospital's policies and procedures
were inadequate with respect to informed consent in what were classified
as "high risk donor" cases.45 The procedural history of this case is some-
what lengthy and will not be repeated here. This case was an interlocu-
tory appeal of a motion to dismiss by the defendants based on the
inadequacy of the plaintiff's expert report.46
A plaintiff filing a medical malpractice claim under the Medical Liabil-
ity Act must file an expert report on each claim, but specific theories
arising from the same group of operative facts are considered one claim
with respect to this requirement. 47 The primary issue concerned informed
consent and causation, i.e., did the expert report provide "proof that a
reasonable person could have been influenced to decide to give or with-
hold consent by being informed of the risks or hazards that were not dis-
closed." 48 The court of appeals decided that the expert report failed to
meet this standard.49 With respect to the fraud, intentional misrepresen-
tation, and negligence claims based on the hospital's policies and proce-
dures, the court of appeals decided that these claims were an attempt by
the plaintiff to recast the informed consent claims.50 As such, those claims
also failed because of the inadequacy of the expert report.51
The case also indirectly addressed a health care provider's disclosure
obligation as part of the informed consent process. In other words, did
the providers involved in this transplant have an obligation to disclose to
the recipient that the donor's organs might be infected by a virus as rare
as the rabies virus? The providers involved in this case did put the patient
on notice that the organs came from a "high risk donor," and although
the public does not have a copy of the informed consent document used
in this case or detailed information about the organ recipient, it is very
likely that the recipient was informed that the donor organ was more
likely to have some unknown condition or infection than a donor who
was not in the high risk category. It is also likely that the recipient's medi-
cal condition was so severe that death may have resulted if the transplant
had not taken place. Otherwise, it is not likely that the recipient would
43. Id.
44. Id. at 587.
45. Id. at 586 (describing the donor as a "high-risk donor" and explaining that he had
been incarcerated up until two weeks before his fatal illness and had a urine drug screen
positive for cocaine and cannabinoids).
46. Id. at 586-87.
47. Id. at 588 (citing Methodist Charlton Med. Ctr. v. Steele, 274 S.W.3d 47, 50 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied); Nexion Health at Duncanville, Inc. v. Ross, 374 S.W.3d
619, 624-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied)).
48. Id. at 589.





have accepted a donation from a high risk donor. The expert report evi-
dently did not demonstrate that informing the patient that the organ
might contain a virus such as the rabies virus would have influenced the
patient's decision. Further, the case did not offer guidance on whether
this information should be included as part of the informed consent
process.
C. DurY TO INFORM: PHYSICIAN LIMITATIONS
Another case involving adequacy of informed consent is Peloza v. Cue-
vas, a case where the plaintiff alleged that the physician's failure to in-
form the patient of the physician's physical condition contributed to the
patient's injuries.52 Dr. Peloza operated on Bright Star Cuevas (Cuevas)
for back pain and then twice more in attempts to rectify the first failed
procedure.53 In addition to alleging a number of mistakes by Dr. Peloza,
Cuevas asserted in an amended petition that Dr. Peloza's carpal tunnel
syndrome and hip abnormality contributed to her injuries.54 She did not
file an expert report to address the allegations in her amended petition.55
Dr. Peloza moved to dismiss the allegations related to informed consent
of his own physical limitations by asserting that the amended petition ad-
ded new claims and causes of action.56 The trial court denied Dr. Peloza's
motion to dismiss.57
Dr. Peloza asserted that an amended expert report was required be-
cause the claims regarding his physical conditions were "far and away
different from an ordinary malpractice claim and more like a lack of in-
formed consent claim," or alternatively that the issue of a physician's im-
pairment "has a different causal connection from an ordinary medical
negligence claim."58 Dr. Peloza supported his position by arguing that a
physician's impairment claim is premised on the surgeon's physical ability
to perform the procedure rather than the physician's thought process or
judgment during the procedure as in a typical HCLC.59 The Dallas Court
of Appeals used this argument to "determine whether the new allegations
regarding [Dr.] Peloza's physical conditions constitute[d] a new cause of
action for health care liability or a new theory of negligence." 60 Not sur-
prisingly, the court of appeals concluded that Cuevas's claims that her
injuries were caused in part by Dr. Peloza's physical problems were not a
new cause of action or a new theory of negligence and did not require a
new expert's report.61
52. Peloza v. Cuevas, 357 S.W.3d 200, 201-02 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).
53. Id. at 201.
54. Id. at 202.
55. Id. at 202-03.
56. Id. at 203.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 204.
59. Id.




The basis for this decision is the statutory language in the Medical
Practice Act defining a health care claim as "a cause of action against a
health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or
other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care ...
which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant." 62 In this
case, the physician's physical limitations/conditions contributed to the pa-
tient's injuries.
III. DISPUTES WITH HEALTH PLANS
Health care providers and the health plans that pay providers have
long had an uneasy relationship. Although health care providers recog-
nize the benefits associated with becoming a contracted or "network"
provider with the major health plans, many of these providers have had
longstanding dissatisfaction with the payment rates that come with these
provider agreements. Health plans, in their continuing efforts to remain
profitable and competitive, have used their size and market penetration
to keep these rates relatively low. Most health care providers do not have
the leverage to successfully negotiate higher rates, which means that they
either have to accept the rates being offered or elect to perform services
as an out of network (OON) provider. Payment rates for OON providers
can be substantially higher than those paid to network providers, but they
come with a substantial cost. Insurance subscribers who receive services
from OON providers are generally subject to much higher co-payment
amounts than if they used a network provider, which is a practice that is
used by the health plans to incentivize subscribers to use network provid-
ers. The two cases presented in this section illustrate the interesting, and
sometimes surprising, approaches used in OON disputes by both the
health plans and health care providers.
A. OUT OF NETWORK DispuTE: RICO ALLEGATION
North Cypress Medical Center (North Cypress) is a hospital that
opened for business in 2007.63 Prior to opening, it attempted to negotiate
an in-network contract agreement with CIGNA Healthcare (CIGNA) but
was unable to agree to terms.64 As a result, North Cypress began business
as an OON provider for subscribers of CIGNA.65 To reduce the amount
of money patients might have to pay when receiving services, North
Cypress offered its CIGNA patients a prompt pay discount (the Policy)
that could be applied to the patients' higher OON co-payment obliga-
tions.66 North Cypress properly put CIGNA on written notice that it was
62. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. CODE ANN. § 74.001(13) (West 2011)).
63. N. Cypress Med. Ctr. v. CIGNA Healthcare, No. 4:09-CV-2556, 2011 WL 5325785,






offering this discount to CIGNA subscribers.67 CIGNA responded to this
notification by informing the hospital that such a discount could "consti-
tute fraud and subject the provider to civil and criminal liability." 68
CIGNA also put North Cypress on a special program that delayed pay-
ments to the hospital and wrote to patients to ask if North Cypress "bal-
ance billed" the patients. 69 North Cypress referred to these actions as the
"Protocol" and asserted that under the Protocol CIGNA paid North
Cypress an average of only $100 per claim, regardless of the actual
charges.70 After approximately one year, North Cypress estimated that
CIGNA underpaid it substantially, resulting in more than $30 million in
damages.71 North Cypress brought this suit alleging that CIGNA had
paid the hospital substantially less than it should have been paid and
these policies did not comply with its contractual obligations. 72 The hospi-
tal claimed that these practices constituted illegal racketeering activities
under the RICO laws.73
A RICO claimant must be able to show three elements: (1) a person
who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity (3) connected to the
acquisition, establishment, conduct or control of an enterprise.74 In order
to survive a motion to dismiss a RICO claim, a plaintiff must plead at
least "two or more predicate acts," show the predicate acts are related,
and show that the acts amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity.75 As predicate acts, North Cypress presented examples of how
CIGNA attempted to extort North Cypress and other health care provid-
ers to contract as in-network providers by enacting "fee forgiveness" in-
vestigations and referring the facilities to its Special Investigative Units
(SIU) for handling of claims.76 The court found the pleadings sufficient to
satisfy the first hurdle for demonstrating racketeering activity.77
Although CIGNA claimed that North Cypress failed to show a threat
of continued criminal activity, the court disagreed.78 North Cypress's
claim that CIGNA investigated fee forgiving practices in the normal
67. Id. Although not explained in the case, the purpose for the written notice was
likely an attempt on the part of North Cypress to prevent CIGNA from claiming that that
the hospital's claims for services misrepresented the amount North Cypress was charging
OON patients. Cases from other jurisdictions have concluded that failure to state that a
discount was being offered for patient copayment obligations could be interpreted as fraud
or misrepresentation in some circumstances. One way to counteract a health plan's ability
to bring such a claim is to put the health plan on notice that the hospital does not intend to
collect the full amount of the patient's copayment obligation.
68. Id.




73. Id. at *3.
74. Id. at *4 (citing Real Estate Innovations, Inc. v. Houston Ass'n of Realtors, 422
Fed. App'x 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2011)).
75. Id. (quoting In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 2002)).





course of business to pressure the hospital to be an in-network provider
was enough to plead continuity. 79 However, North Cypress's claim of ille-
gal racketeering activity failed with respect to showing that CIGNA used
any part of its income to acquire an interest in or to operate the alleged
enterprise.80 Additionally, North Cypress failed to show how CIGNA's
use of these funds injured North Cypress.8 ' In short, challenging a health
plan's payment practices is difficult when an OON provider lacks a con-
tractual relationship with that health plan.82
B. DENIAL OF PAYMENT DISPUTE
Fisher v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas is another case involving a
dispute over a provider's OON status and is notable for the defense used
by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas (BCBSTX).83 Dr. Fisher had a
number of affiliated companies that worked together to provide anesthe-
sia services to obstetricians and gynecologists who perform surgeries in
their offices (collectively referred to here as Paragon).84 Paragon pro-
vided the physicians who performed the anesthesiology services with the
equipment and supplies necessary for anesthesia.85 Paragon entered into
a Group Managed Care Agreement with BCBSTX that expressly pro-
vided for payment of the physicians's anesthesia services. 86 Paragon
claimed that it had entered into agreements with BCBSTX that included
an implied contract for payment of the anesthesia and equipment services
to the various Paragon entities.87 Paragon alleged that BCBSTX paid for
its services beginning in 2004, but in July 2010, the health plan began to
recoup amounts previously paid.88 This change in practice gave rise to
Paragon's claim that BCBSTX violated its express and implied
contracts. 89
BCBSTX's position was that its policies indicated that a provider was
not permitted to bill for the "services, supplies, and equipment, which are
considered the 'technical component' . . . of an anesthesiologist's work." 90
BCBSTX claimed that Paragon violated this rule, and as a result,
79. Id.
80. Id. at *6.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Fisher v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., 879 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (N.D. Tex.
2012).
84. Id. (explaining that Paragon entities include Paragon Anesthesia Associates, P.A.,




87. Id. at 584-85.
88. Id. at 585.
89. Id.
90. Id. Under the BCBSTX policy, physicians who perform surgical procedures in
their offices or "non-facility" settings furnish the equipment and supplies necessary to per-
form the surgical procedure in their office. Id. When these same procedures are performed
in a facility setting, such as a surgical hospital, the hospital is reimbursed for providing the
space, staff, equipment, and supplies necessary to provide the procedure; the physician's
938 [Vol. 66
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BCBSTX inadvertently paid Paragon for services and "non-facility set-
ting" costs it was not entitled to receive. 91 BCBSTX counterclaimed, as-
serting that Paragon submitted its claims in violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).92 Paragon moved to
dismiss BCBSTX's ERISA claims on the basis that BCBSTX lacked
standing as a fiduciary to bring such a claim.93
BCBSTX's ERISA counterclaim was unsuccessful. BCBSTX argued
that it overpaid Paragon because Paragon did not comply with
BCBCTX's policies, but this assertion did not involve a benefit determi-
nation, which is a requirement for an ERISA claim.94 After dismissing
BCBSTX's ERISA counterclaim, the court ordered the parties to make
certain disclosures in an attempt to end what the court characterized as a
"legal merry-go-round." 9 5
IV. MISCELLANEOUS DISPUTES
The next group of cases show some of the business challenges faced by
health care providers, but they are otherwise unrelated. The first is a chal-
lenge to the administrative appeals process in a dispute with a Medicare
law. 96 The second is a case on the duty to inform and the learned interme-
diary doctrine involving a pharmaceutical manufacturer and three physi-
cians.97 This case went to the Texas Supreme Court, despite the fact that
none of the parties failed in their responsibilities or duties to the patient.
The last is a fairly typical breach of contract case, but it addresses an
interesting question of exclusivity and a standard health care contract
provision.9 8
A. CHALLENGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS PROCESS
When health care providers have a dispute with a law, rule, or regula-
tion involving the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, they
generally have to endure a very long administrative appeals process, and
in some cases, the process is inadequate as a remedy. The following case
was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but it is an
example of the inadequacy of administrative remedies.99 Additionally,
professional fee is reduced because he or she is no longer responsible for providing the
equipment, supplies, space, and staff. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 587.
93. Id. Paragon also claimed that BCBSTX should have included other Blue Cross
home plans in the counterclaim. Id.
94. Id. at 590-91 (referring to Lone Star OB/GYN Assoc. v. Aetna Health Inc., 579
F.3d 525, 531 (5th Cir. 2009) for its position that the health plan's claims were entirely
separate from coverage and arose out of Paragon's independent duty as a contracted pro-
vider to follow the health plan's policies).
95. Id. at 594.
96. See Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2002).
97. See Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2012).
98. See Greater Houston Radiation Oncology, P.A. v. Sadler Clinic Assoc., P.A., 384
S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2012, pet. denied).
99. See Sebelius, 691 F.3d at 651.
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the Fifth Circuit apparently recognized the plaintiffs' difficult situation
and concluded the case by saying: "[t]he ever-evolving landscape of
health care in the United States may one day prompt a new structure for
judicial review in a case such as this. 'If the balance is to be struck anew,
the decision must come from Congress' and not from the courts."100
The plaintiffs were Physician Hospitals of America, an organization
that supports physician-owned hospitals, and Texas Spine & Joint Hospi-
tal (TSJH), a physician-owned hospital. 01 Plaintiffs contested the consti-
tutionality of a change to the federal law commonly known as the "Stark
Law." 0 2 The Stark Law was enacted in 1989 and limits the circumstances
in which physicians can refer Medicare patients to entities in which the
physicians have a financial relationship.1 03 Until 2003, the Stark Law con-
tained an exception that permitted physicians to refer Medicare patients
to hospitals in which the physicians had an ownership interest.10 4 This
exception was essentially eliminated when limits were placed on the abil-
ity of existing physician-owned hospitals to expand their services under
Section 6001 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010.105
Prior to passage of Section 6001, TSJH began a $30 million expansion
project that was put on hold upon passage of the law. 106 When TSJH
stopped the project, it had spent approximately $3 million.107 TSJH
claimed that in order to challenge the change to the law by filing an ad-
ministrative claim, it would have to complete construction of the expan-
sion, treat a patient in the new space, and wait for a denial of payment. 0
Then, TSJH would have to keep the space unoccupied for however long it
would take to work through the administrative appeals process, which
could possibly take years.109 In an attempt to avoid such a financially
disastrous outcome, TSJH and Physicians Hospitals brought this action in
federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis
that Section 6001 is void for vagueness and violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.1 10
The district court went through a lengthy discussion citing numerous
cases for its unsurprising conclusion that the plaintiffs were required to
proceed with available administrative procedures before addressing the
matter in federal court.' The plaintiffs' failure to do so meant that the
100. Id. at 659 (quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 627 (1984)).
101. Id. at 652.
102. Id. at 651-53 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2010)).
103. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn.
104. Exceptions to the Referral Prohibition Related to Ownership or Investment Inter-
ests, 42 C.F.R. § 411.356 (2011).






111. Id. at 652-58.
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federal district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case.112 The Fifth Circuit also declined to accept the plaintiffs' argument
that forcing them to go through the administrative appeals process
"would result in the practical denial of judicial review."113 The fact that
the administrative appeals process could only be triggered after TSJH
spent millions of dollars to complete the expansion facility did not give
them the right to circumvent the administrative appeals process.114
B. LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE AND DIRECT
TO CONSUMER MARKETING
Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton is a case that addresses the duty to inform
patients of the risks and benefits associated with a prescription drug.' 15
The case discusses the "learned intermediary doctrine" but makes no
changes to the doctrine.116 However, it is notable for health care provid-
ers because it addresses this doctrine in the context of direct-to-patient
marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers, an increasingly common
method by which new drugs and pharmaceuticals are marketed. The
Texas Supreme Court upheld the learned intermediary doctrine with re-
spect to the plaintiff's claims against the pharmaceutical manufacturer
and reinforced that "the bedrock of our healthcare system is the physi-
cian-patient relationship, and the ultimate decision for any treatment
rests with the prescribing physician and the patient," even in the context
of drugs marketed directly to the consumers." 7
The plaintiff in this case had multiple medical problems, one of which
was Crohn's disease." 8 Upon experiencing a flare up of this condition,
the plaintiff agreed to treatment with a relatively new drug called Remi-
cade, which is manufactured by Centocor, Inc. (Centocor).119 Dr. Haupt-
man prescribed the medication and alleged that he informed the patient
of the risks and benefits of the drug.120 The drug was actually adminis-
tered by Dr. Bullen, a physician who ran an infusion clinic.121 Dr. Bullen
provided an informational video furnished by Centocor for the patient
while she was receiving the drug, but he did not provide any further infor-
mation about the risks or benefits for Remicade.122 Following three epi-
sodes of treatment, the patient's Crohn's disease showed marked
112. Id. at 659.
113. Id. at 656 (citing Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 22
(2000)).
114. Id. at 657 (citing Council for Urological Interests v. Sebelius, 668 F.3d 704, 708
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that a "party may not circumvent the channeling requirement
by showing merely that 'postponement of judicial review would mean added inconvenience
or cost in an isolated, particular case"') (quoting Shalala, 529 U.S. at 22-23)).
115. Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. 2012).
116. Id. at 154-59.
117. Id. at 166.
118. Id. at 143.
119. Id. at 144.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 146-47.
122. Id. at 143, 146-47.
2013] 941
SMU LAW REVIEW
improvement. 123 However, the patient started experiencing severe arthri-
tis symptoms, for which she requested treatment from a third physician,
Dr. Pop-Moody, who then prescribed additional infusions of Remicade
for these symptoms; and although the patient showed short term relief,
the symptoms ultimately increased.124 Following evaluation by yet an-
other physician, the patient was diagnosed with a rare side effect of
Remicade treatment called lupus syndrome. 125 The patient filed lawsuits
against Centocor, the two physicians who prescribed Remicade, and the
physician who administered it.126
At trial, the plaintiff stated the following claims against Centocor:
fraud, negligent undertaking, negligent misbranding, negligent marketing,
misrepresentation to a plaintiff's physician regarding the risk of lupus,
and misrepresentation regarding the risk of hepatitis C.12 7 Centocor ob-
jected and repeatedly raised the learned intermediary doctrine. 128 The
jury found Centocor liable for, among other things, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion to the physicians, and negligent misbranding. 129 Before judgment
was entered, Drs. Hauptman and Pop-Moody settled and were non-
suited.130 On appeal, Centocor repeated its position that it had no duty to
warn the plaintiff as a matter of law.131 However, the appellate court dis-
agreed and affirmed the trial court's judgment based on the direct-to-
consumer (DTC) exception to the learned intermediary doctrine.132
The Texas Supreme Court presented history of the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine, including a discussion of the exceptions to the doctrine.133
The DTC, or mass marketing, exception has been recognized by only a
few courts.134 Prior to the appellate court ruling, no court in Texas had
adopted this exception, and the supreme court concluded that while some
circumstances might require exceptions to the doctrine, the exception did
not apply in this particular case.'35
Several factors entered into this conclusion. First, the plaintiff's alleged
harm was not caused by Centocor's direct advertising.136 Neither she nor
her husband remembered any DTC advertising by Centocor about Remi-
cade other than a textual banner displayed during a CNN broadcast.137
Her claims about Centocor's advertising were based on the video she
123. Id. at 148.
124. Id. at 148-49.
125. Id. at 149.
126. Id. at 143.
127. Id. at 150.




132. Id. at 152.
133. Id. at 154-61.
134. Id. at 160 (referring to Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997) and
Perez v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) as examples).





viewed while receiving the infusion. After she had been prescribed the
medication by her physician. 38 This video was characterized as an infor-
mational video and not the type of DTC advertising seen in other cases
where the exception may have applied.139 Appropriate safeguards for pa-
tients presently exist under federal and state laws regulating the design,
marketing, and distribution of prescription drugs, as well as the require-
ment that patients who may be seeking a drug as a result of DTC market-
ing may only obtain that drug after it has been prescribed by a physician
who has an obligation to provide the patient with information about the
benefits and risks of the drug.140 As such, the supreme court found
no reason to adopt an exception where the physician-patient rela-
tionship existed, the pharmaceutical company provided a warning to
the patient's prescribing doctors that included the side effect of
which the patient complains, and the patient had already visited with
her prescribing physician and decided to take the drug before she
saw the informational video.141
This conclusion is consistent with the existing obligation of physicians
that requires them to obtain informed consent for the drugs they pre-
scribe to patients.
C. EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Greater Houston Radiation Oncology, P.A. v. Sadler Clinic Association,
P.A.142 is a case involving a fairly typical breach of contract dispute, but it
is noteworthy with respect to how a common non-referral obligation pro-
vision is rendered inapplicable for purposes of evaluating whether or not
the agreement established an exclusive referral arrangement. It is also a
reminder that contracts must accurately and expressly reflect the intent of
the parties.
Sadler Clinic Association, P.A. (Sadler Clinic) agreed to establish a ra-
diation oncology center (the Center) and contracted with Dr. Kanedy
who owned Greater Houston Oncology, P.A. (GHRO), a physician
group of radiation oncologists.143 GHRO agreed to provide the Center
with radiation oncologists, billing and collection services, and manage-
ment services with related entities.144 All of these entities are collectively
referred to herein as GHRO. When the Center was completed, a GHRO
physician began providing radiation oncology services to patients re-
ferred to the Center for treatment.145 Shortly after the Center opened,
the GHRO physician observed that another physician was brought to the
138. Id. at 162-63.
139. Id. at 163.
140. Id. at 163-64.
141. Id. at 164.
142. Greater Houston Radiation Oncology, P.A. v. Sadler Clinic Assoc., P.A., 384
S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2012, pet. denied).





Center for a tour.146 This physician told the GHRO physician that he was
interviewing for a job.14 7 Subsequent to this interaction, Dr. Kanedy tried
to amend the management agreement to a ten-year term and to increase
the penalties for termination. 148 The Center's board declined to agree to
the amendment. 149 Several months later, the board hired a new physician
who began receiving all of the referrals from the Sadler Clinic, which re-
sulted in the GHRO physician receiving no new referrals and his and
GHRO's business sharply deteriorating. 15 0 The Center also terminated
the GHRO entity management agreement by placing GHRO on notice
that it was in breach of the billing services agreement. 151 Finally, the
Center filed a declaratory action seeking a judgment that the professional
services agreement was not an exclusive agreement. 152
The Beaumont Court of Appeals's analysis included a breach of con-
tract analysis that will not be reviewed in its entirety.153 However, the
discussion of exclusivity with respect to the physician services agreement
(PSA) is notable. The PSA had no express provision stating that the
agreement was or was not exclusive. 154 But it did include a "no referral
obligation" provision common to many professional services and other
types of agreements between health care providers.155 The Center argued
that the lack of any express exclusivity provisions and the "no referral
obligation" provision rendered the PSA non-exclusive, and GHRO ar-
gued that the "necessary to operate" language in the introductory
paragraphs of the PSA established an exclusive relationship. 1 5 6
The court of appeals analyzed the exclusivity issue by evaluating the
PSA as a whole and explained that the PSA contemplated that GHRO
would provide multiple physicians, subject to the Center's approval.'57
The court of appeals also noted that Texas law generally does not allow
for one contract provision to be interpreted in a way that nullifies the
other.158 Although recognizing that the no referral obligation provision
does not require the Sadler Clinic's physicians to refer patients to the
146. Id. at 881-82.
147. Id. at 882.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 883.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 884-90.
154. Id. at 884-86.
155. Id. at 886. A no referral obligation provision requires the parties to agree that
nothing in the agreement requires either party to refer patients or other business to the
other party and that the parties will conduct themselves in such a way that they will not
violate the federal anti-kickback law as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b, commonly re-
ferred to as the anti-kickback law. See id.
156. Id. at 886-87.
157. Id. at 888.
158. Id. at 886 (citing as examples Burnett Ranches, Ltd. v. Cano Petroleum, Inc., 289
S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) and Lavaca Bay Autoworld v.




GRHO physician in violation of the anti-kickback law, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the provision does not address which physicians will
provide the radiation oncology services. 159 This and other language in the
agreement resulted in the court of appeals's conclusion that the parties
intended that the GHRO physician or physicians would provide all of the
radiation oncology services for the Center.160 This would prohibit the
Sadler Clinic from engaging another physician to furnish these services
and would render the PSA an exclusive agreement, notwithstanding the
lack of any specific exclusivity language and the no referral obligation
provision.161
V. HIGH PROFILE CASES
The cases in this section were chosen because of the high profile of the
decision or because of the subject matter of the dispute. These cases in-
clude the Supreme Court's decision in the challenge to the 2010 Afforda-
ble Care Actl 6 2 and a class action case challenging an amendment to the
Texas Woman's Right to Know Act.163
A. CHALLENGE TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE Acr
The Affordable Care Act (the Act)164 was the landmark health care
reform legislation passed during President Obama's first term. This law
was almost immediately challenged by a number of states and parties,
including the Texas Attorney General and the Attorneys Generals of
twenty-five other states, private individuals, and a group of independent
businesses. 165 This article will limit its comments to a very brief summary
of two critical challenges.
The parties claimed that the Act's individual mandate and expansion of
the Medicaid program were unconstitutional.166 The case was initially
brought in a Florida federal district court, which granted summary judg-
ment to the plaintiffs' claim under the theories that the Medicaid expan-
sion was unconstitutional, the individual mandate exceeded
Congressional authority, and the Act was not severable.167 The district
court essentially declared the entire Act invalid.168 The federal govern-
ment appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, where the unconstitutionality of
the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion was affirmed; how-
ever, the individual mandate's non-severability was reversed.'69
159. Id. at 887.
160. Id. at 888.
161. Id.
162. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
163. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th
Cir. 2012).
164. See generally, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).




169. Id. at 2580-81.
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The individual mandate, found at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, requires most
Americans to maintain at least a minimal level of health insurance cover-
age.170 There are a number of exceptions to this requirement for some
individuals, such as prisoners and undocumented aliens, but most Ameri-
cans would be required by 2014 to secure health insurance coverage ei-
ther through a private health insurance plan or through a government
health care program such as Medicare or Medicaid.171 Individuals who
fail to comply with this requirement will be subject to a "[s]hared respon-
sibility payment" payable to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).172 The
Supreme Court held that even though the individual mandate exceeded
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, it was permissible as a
tax within Congress's taxing authority.173
The Medicaid expansion requires states to expand coverage of the ex-
isting Medicaid program (which currently covers children, pregnant wo-
men, needy families, the elderly, and the disabled who meet certain
financial hardship requirements) to cover all adults with income less than
or equal to 133 percent of the federal poverty level.174 This requirement
increases funding to states that expand the program, but for states that do
not comply with the new requirement, the Act withdraws all federal fund-
ing of those states' Medicaid programs.175 The penalty portion of the ex-
pansion was deemed improper under Congress's spending power, but it
was held to be severable from the Act.176
B. CHALLENGES To ABORTION LAw OBLIGATIONS
Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey in-
volves a 2011 amendment to the 2003 Texas Woman's Right to Know Act
(WRKA).177 This amendment requires physicians who perform abortions
to furnish women requesting the procedure with a sonogram of the fetus,
make the heartbeat of the fetus audible, explain the results of the proce-
dure, and wait twenty-four hours before performing the procedure.' 78 Al-
though WRKA already includes penalties for performing an abortion
when not in full compliance with the statute,179 the 2011 amendment also
amended the Texas Occupations Code to deny or revoke a physician's
170. Id. at 2580 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1)).
173. Id. at 2585-601 (discussing the Act's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause
and as a tax).
174. Id. at 2581-82.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2601-09 (discussing the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion).
177. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572-73
(5th Cir. 2012).
178. Id. at 573 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West
2011)).
179. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.018 (West 2010) (providing that physi-
cians who fail to comply with the statute are guilty of a misdemeanor and are subject to up
to $10,000 in fines).
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license for violating these provisions.180
Physicians and abortion providers filed a class action lawsuit against
the Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services and
the Executive Director of the Texas Medical Board seeking injunctive re-
lief and alleging various constitutional violations.' 81 The Fifth Circuit
ruled that the plaintiffs "failed to demonstrate constitutional
flaws."1 82Although the Fifth Circuit's decision in this case may have dis-
appointed individuals who support a woman's right to choose, it appears
to be legally sound. Another outcome would have been inconsistent with
other Texas rules relating to informed consent, including those promul-
gated by the Texas Disclosure Panel.'83 This outcome is also consistent
with previous Supreme Court cases, as discussed below.
The primary objection of the physicians was that the disclosure provi-
sions "compel speech" in violation of the First Amendment. 184 They also
asserted that certain portions of the provisions were vague.185 The physi-
cians asserted that the requirement to perform the sonogram, make the
heartbeat of the fetus audible, and explain the results of both examina-
tions was an assertion of the "state's 'ideological message' concerning the
fetal life" because it served no medical purpose except to discourage
abortion.186 The Fifth Circuit analyzed this assertion using the Supreme
Court's 1992 holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, which in addition to reaffirming a woman's substantive
due process right to terminate a pregnancy also "upheld an informed-
consent statute over precisely the same 'compelled speech' challenges
made here."' 87 Also, the Fifth Circuit supported its decision regarding
the disclosure requirements by citing an Eighth Circuit decision from
2011 that likewise found that an abortion informed consent regulation
was not compelled speech. 88
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of Casey and the physicians' compelled
speech argument is lengthy and well worth a close reading, but its key
conclusions are as follows:
(1) Informed consent laws are part of the state's regulation of the prac-
tice of medicine and can take into consideration the state's compel-
ling interest in protecting the life of the fetus as well as the
mother's health;189
180. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 573 (referring to TEX. Occ. CoDE AN. § 164.055(a) (West
2011)).
181. Id. at 572.
182. Id. at 584.
183. See 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 601 (2004) (describing the rule of the Panel with
respect to informed consent for certain designated procedures).
184. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 573.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 574.
187. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
188. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011)).
189. Id. at 579.
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(2) As long as informed consent laws do not impose an undue burden
on a women's right to have an abortion, the laws are permissi-
ble;190 and
(3) The disclosures and written consent required by the amendment
"are sustainable under Casey ... [and] are within the State's power
to regulate the practice of medicine."191
In addition to concluding that the informed consent provisions were
not a violation of the physicians's First Amendment rights, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that the amendments were not impermissibly vague or in
any way inconsistent with the rest of WRKA.19 2 While these arguments
are not as compelling as the Fifth Circuit's conclusion related to the First
Amendment issue, these too were probably properly decided.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anyone working in a health care field knows that the backdrop of
health care laws, rules, and regulations is complex. The challenges arising
from this regulatory background are not likely to decrease in the coming
years. In fact, in light of new laws, such as the Affordable Care Act of
2010, the pressures on health care providers to find ways to work within
the context of these laws are likely to increase. As such, we can expect to
see more cases challenging interpretation of these laws brought by health
care providers and those who work with them in an attempt to maintain
or expand their practices.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 580.
192. Id. at 580-84.
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